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RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS IN
KENTUCKY
The English Statute of Frauds required all declarations or
creations of trusts in land to be manifested in writing. If, how-
ever upon any conveyance of land a trust should arise or result
Ly the implication or construction of law, etc., a writing was not
essential. It seems important to fingerprint as far as possible
resulting and constructive trusts in Kentucky. The Court of
Appeals hag usually made the distinction clear.'
I. RESULTING TRUSTS
At common law before the Statute of Uses it has been
pointed out 2 that a resulting use would or might arise in any of
the three situations: (a) Where A enfeoffed B and his heirs, B
paying no consideration. (It is also to be assumed that B was
not a close blood relative and there was no declared disposal of
the use.) (b) Where A paid the purchase price for a convey-
ance by X and title was taken in B's name. (c) Where a
feoffment did not dispose of the whole beneficial interest or was
made on a use which for some reason failed and the feoffee paid
no consideration. The theory was that to raise a use for the
benefit of the feoffor carried out the intention of the parties and
it was said that a use resulted to him.
The first type of resulting use did not come down to the law
of trusts. If A bargains and sells Blackacre to B without
consideration but without intending to benefit B, still no
trust is presumed. If B made an oral promise to hold for A
the promise would not be enforceable in the great majority
of jurisdictions because they have adopted the provisions of
the English statute. B, however, is unjustly enriched at the
expense of A if he is allowed to keep Blackacre and the English
courts raise a constructive trust under the eighth section of
the Stdtute of Frauds to avoid the unjust benefit to B,
thus restoring the statuts quo. While this reaches the same
result as the enforcement the oral promise would reach, it is
still allowable if it can be brought under the eighth section
I See for example Fovshee v. Foushee, 163 Ky. 524 (1915), and
Motley v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 (1925), but cf. Williams v. Mclanahan,
60 Ky. 379 (1361); 'Webb x% Webb, 200 Ky. 488 (1923); Hoge v. Ken-
tucky River Corp., 216 Ky. 51 (1926).
' By Dean Pound in 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420 (1920). See Scott's Cases
on Trusts (2nd ed., 1931), pp. 337-367, 413-439.
K. 1.J.2
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by virtue of some recognized principle, though enforcement of
the promise would not be allowable under the seventh section.
This topic will be further pursued subsequently.
The other types of resulting uses did descend to the law of
trusts so that resulting trusts arise (a) where an express trust
fails in whole or in part and no other disposition is made of the
property; (b) where the purchase money is paid in whole or in
part by one person and title is taken in the name of another;
and (c) where an express trust does not exhaust the entire trust
property transferred to the trustee.3
a. Where an Express Trust Fails in Whole or in Part.
This type of resulting trust in Kentucky has been
illustrated almost exclusively in cases where an intended
charitable trust failed.4 If one person conveys land for a school
and others contribute the funds with which a building is built
thereon, and the object fails, the premises must be sold and
the proceeds pro-rated.5 So if the donor is himself the trustee
and the trust fails he is relieved of his obligation as trustee.0
Kentucky holds, however, that if there is some business
arrangement made by the contributor whereby he receives some
consideration for the contribution, no trust will result even
though there is something left.7 In Morrow v. Slaughter
8
premises were sold for a small consideration and the terms of
the conveyance provided that the profits from the property con-
veyed should be applied first to repay the purchase price bor-
rowed by the trustees and thereafter be applied for the benefit
of the local church, but if the church should be dissolved then to
be used as the Synod should direct. On dissolution of the local
church the grantors brought a bill in equity for the retransfer
'Perhaps an illustration of this type is Smith v. Cornett, 26
K. L R. 265 (1904). The heirs of A had conveyed all their interests in
the estate of A to B. A considerable tract of land, however, was owned
by A of which none of the parties had knowledge. As to this addi-
tional tract B was held to be a trustee. He had found among A's
papers a bond for title to the land executed by one D and he did not
know the conveyance had been made to A though such was the fact.
B sued the heirs of D and title to the whole tract was adjudged to him.
4 Grundy v. Neal, 147 Ky. 729 (1912).
5 Taylor v. Rogers, 130 Ky. 112 (1908).
C f. McDaniel v. Watson, 67 Ky. 234 (1898); Trustees v. Alexander,
20 K. L. R. 391 (1898).
Gibson v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. 481 (1847).868 Ky. 330 (1868).
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of the premises. It was held that having received consideration
they could not recover. The court refused to decide where the
proceeds would go in the event there should be no Synod to
direct the distribution.
The Kentucky court is firmly committed to the proposition
that if some business arrangement has been made so that the con-
tributor receives something which may be called consideration
for his contribution, nothing beyond what he expressly bargained
for can come to him. No respect is held for the argument that
to the extent that there is something left over, to that extent the
contributor has not received full consideration. The leading
case is Easurn v. Bohon.9 The Shaker colony was made up of
members who had conveyed their property to the society. It was
expressly agreed that there should never be any return of the
property. On the final dissolution of the society a considerable
property was left and certain heirs of X claimed a proportion-
ate share of the contributions of their ancestor. In return for
the contribution of members it had been covenanted that the
property contributed should be used by the society, and that it
should support, maintain, and care for its members throughout
their lives. But the members did provide the property and on
dissolution the property must go somewhere. It is not sufficient
to say no resulting trust was intended, because the dissolution
was neither intended nor expected.
Support for the Kentucky view may be found in Cunnack
v. Edwards, an English case. 0 The court held that where a
business arrangement had been made by a society for the benefit
of its members the distributees of the deceased members could
make no claim to the 1,200 pounds that remained after the
society had come to an end. In a more recent case," however,
funds had been .contributed by certain persons in accordance
with 'rules which they had set up, to be used for the benefit of
the contributors for the time being. The need for the service
had ended, and there was a surplus remaining. It was held that
the funds should be prorated among the contributors. Of course,
the intention of the contributors should be given effect in accord-
'180 Ky. 451 (1918). [In Gass v. Wilhite, 32 Ky. 170 (1834), it
was held that certain "Shakers" could not secede and thereby have
the right to withdraw their contributions.]
202 Ch. 679 (1896).
11 In re Customs and Execise Officers Fund (1917), 2 Ch. 18.
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ance with the agreement made, but the agreement is silent with
respect to the situation that has arisen and it is pure fiction to
say that no return was contemplated. Just what was to be done
with the funds in the Kentucky case the court did not say.12
In CJunnack v. Edwards the property went to the Crown.' 3
In other cases charitable trusts have failed because of the
indefiniteness of the object, and resulting trusts arise. Thus
a gift of a sum of money which testator authorizes the executor
to give to the poor fails because the "object is too indefinite or
is unascertainable".14
b. Purchase Price Paid by One Person and Title Taken in
the Name of Another.
Kentucky is one of five states which by statute have sought
to abolish this important type of resulting trusts. 1 The statute
does not apply to those cases where title was taken by the
grantee without the consent of the one who furnished the con-
sideration, nor where the grantee has violated some trust.
Neither does it apply to cases involving personal property,'0
nor will it control where the trust arose before the statute was
enacted and the enforcement of it was sought thereafter. 17
The typical illustration within the statute is the case where
2It had already been held in Adams v. Bohon, 176 Ky. 66 (1917),
that the property did not go to the common school fund under section
323 of the statutes.
"Various other associated problems are found in Fuquay v. Trus-
tees, 22 K. L. R. 744 (1900); Lutes v. L. if X. By. Co., 158 Ky. 259
(1914); McElroy v. Pope, 153 Ky. 108 (1913).
" Spauding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School, 21 K. L. R. 1107
(1899) ("for charitable objects to be expended for said objects in this
Diocese of Louisville according to the trustees' discretion"); Thompson
v. Brown, 24 K. L. R. 1066 (1902). But cf. Moore v. Moore, 34 Ky. 354
(1836) (fund for educating some poor orphans in this county to be
selected by the County Court. It was held that here was a naked power
and that the trustees might exercise it and the bill of the heirs was dis-
missed); Atty. Gen. v. Wallace, 46 Ky. 611 (1847) ("For such char-
itable and benevolent institutions as may appear most useful for dis-
seminating the Gospel at home and abroad." Held valid); Graham v.
English, 160 Ky., 375 (1914) ("to be devoted to such benevolent objects
as they, the trustees, may select." Held valid).
Is See Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930, Sec. 2353; Scott, Resulting
Trusts Upon the Purchase of Land, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 669 (1927).
"Aynesworth v. Haldeman, 63 Ky. 565 (1866).
"Martin v. Martin, 68 Ky. 47 (1868); Ewing v. Bibb, 70 Ky. 654
(1870). In Browning v. Coppage, 6 Ky. 37 (1813), the prospective
spouses made an antenuptial agreement that in the absence of issue,
her property should descend to her heirs. Slaves bought by the hus-
band with the wife's money were held to pass under her will.
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title has been taken in the name of another at the express
instance or at least with the knowledge and consent of the owner
of the funds.' s These are largely cases where husband or wife
has furnished the consideration and title was taken in the name
of the other spouse.' 9 The result is, of course, the same where
one spouse furnishes the consideration and title is taken in the
names of both.20 There is, on the other hand, a large number
of Kentucky cases which come within the first exception to the
statutory rule.
2 1
The parties A and B may contribute to the purchase of
certain premises in unequal amounts, each to have a beneficial
interest though title is taken in the name of B, but they may
also validly agree by oral agreement that A shall have a par-
ticular portion of the land so purchased. Thus in Brothers v.
Porter2 2 A had assigned his interest under an oral agreement
with B and C for the purchase of certain premises, to X and
X executed his note for A's share of the purchase price. X
sought to escape liability on the note on the ground that the
assignor was to have a particular tract of the land purchased
and since the agreement was oral it could not be enforced and
the consideration for the note had failed. -He was held liable
and collection of the judgment on the note could not be enjoined.
This statute has not always found favor with the court.
For example, in one case23 where the grantee made a parol
agreement to hold for the one who paid the consideration it was
held that the result was not controlled by the statute, that the
statute applied only to the naked fact where title was taken in
I" Brafford v. Brafford, 4 K. L. R. 351 (1882); Fields v. Napier, 26
K. L. R. 240 (1904); Bishop v. Simpson, 224 Ky. 289 (1928).1, Watt v. Watt, 19 K. L. R. 25 (1897); Nelson v. Nelson, 29 K. L.
R. 885 (1906); Martin v. Franklin, 159 Ky. 816 (1914); Neel v. Noland,
166 Ky. 455 (1915); Cooksey v. Tolliver, 208 Ky. 160 (1925); Mullins
v. Robinson, 225 Ky. 648 (1928).
-" Masters v. Masters, 222 Ky. 427 (1927); Skidmore v. Harris, 157
Ky. 756 (1914).
ftMallory v. Mallory, 68 Ky. 464 (1869); Miller v. Edwards, 70 Ky.
394 (1870); Bedford v. Graves, 8 K. L. R. 262 (1886); Harlan v. Bilke,
100 Ky. 642 (1897) (Emancipated minor employed as jockey sent his
earnings to his father who invested them in land); Combs v. Combs,
30 X. L. R. 873 (1907) (Father and son each contribute and title
taken in name of son); Patrick v. Prater, 144 Ky. 771 (1911); Neel v.
Noland, 166 Ky. 455 (1915); Deboe v. Brown, 198 Ky. 275 (1923);
Phillips v. Bowles, 209 Ky. 580 (1925); Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375
(1925) (Husband and wife cases).
2 45 Ky. 106 (1845).
1 Smith v. Smith, 121 S. W. 1002 (Ky. 1909).
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the name of another without any agreement between the parties.
In still other cases the court has enforced a trust and has failed
to note any bearing that this statute might have.24 In Lindsay
v. WilliaMS25 the court seems to have added a qualification to
those provided by the statute. A husband, to secure the loan,
executed a mortgage to his wife's father. The mortgage did not
disclose so far as appears, the daughter's interest. The father
foreclosed the mortgage and appropriated the proceeds. On his
death his will charged the daughter with an advancement of
$3,000. It was held that this statute did not apply to debts, and
securities for payment of them but to absolute deeds only and
that the father was trustee for the daughter of the proceeds of
the foreclosure. In Row v. Johnson,26 A foreclosed his vendor's
lien in the name of his son-in-law, B, to whom he had gratuitously
assigned his interest for the purpose of the suit but not intend-
ing to benefit B. After foreclosure title was taken in the name
of B, all without the knowledge of B. The court correctly raised
a constructive trust against B but it failed to note the possible
bearing of Section 2353.
Various cases of hardship have arisen by virtue of the
statute. Such, for example, was the case of Isaacs v. Isaacs27
where A bought land and took title in the name of himself and
his brother B to enable the latter to be A's surety. In Grant v.
Grant2s plaintiff furnished the funds for the construction of a
house upon a lot the title to which he knew to be in his tson's
wife.29 In many cases, however, the hardship is decreased by
2 Sweet v. Stevens, 23 K. L. R. 407 (1901) (Brother and sister
agreed to buy land jointly, he to pay two-thirds and she one-third of
the price and title to be taken in her name. She was held to be a
trustee as to a two-thirds interest); Noel v. Fitzpatrick, 124 Ky. 787
(1907) (Wife bid in land and furnished the consideration to her
husband who by the agreement took title in his own name. He was
held to be trustee).
" 63 Ky. 475 (1866).
-25 K. L. R. 1799 (1904).
"206 Ky. 540 (1925).
-12 Ky. 0. 60 (1883).
"'So in Bybee v. Wilson, 196 Ky. 644 (1922) (A stepson furnished
funds to his stepfather and the latter left the land to his second wife).
See also Russell v. Russell, 11 K. L. R. 547 (1888) (The heirs released
their sister's interest in their father's estate to the sister's husband
with her consent. A child of this marriage claimed to have a resulting
trust set up, after the death of the sister, against the children of the
second marriage of their father since their mother had paid the con-
sideration. Held no trust because the mother had consented).
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the holding that the one who furnished the consideration may
recover the amount of it from the title-holder.30
There are many interesting variations of the problem.
Thus, in Deposit Bank v. Rose3 1 the wife, having abandoned her
husband so that he had a cause of action for divorce, conveyed
to the husband's mother a portion of her land in consideration
of the procurement of a divorce by the husband. He accord-
ingly, obtained a divorce and the conveyance was made. It was
held that the consideration for the land was paid by the husband
and that the mother should be made a resulting trustee of it so
as to protect the husband's creditors. His consent that title be
taken in his mother would not prevent his creditors from claim-
ing the benefit of the transaction. In another case3 2 a wife re-
leased dower at the solicitation of her husband, the considera-
tion being his agreement to buy certain other land for their
daughter. The husband bought the land but took title in his
own name. It was held that he was a resulting trustee, and that
the case came within the exceptions to the statute. It seems, how-
ever, better to argue that the statute did not aply to this case. A
resulting trust requires the conveyance by a third person to one
who did not furnish the consideration. Here the wife conveyed
to the husband (that is, released her claim of dower). It is
not, therefore, a case where A buys from X and takes title in
the name of B, but rather a case where A conveys to B on B's
promise to do some other act. This case amounts to the specific
performance of a promise.33 Since the consideration did not
proceed from the daughter a trust could not result to her. Per-
haps it might be said that a constructive trust should be imposed
upon the husband to avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of
the wife. Other courts have, however, seen their way clear to
reach a similar result 34 but it would seem that there is no ade-
"Graves v. Graves, 60 Ky. 167 (1860); Lindsay v. Williams, 63
Ky. 475 (1866); Martin v. Martin, 68 Ky. 47 (1868); Mannen v. Brad-
berry, 81 Ky. 153 (1883); Stroud v. Ross, 118 Ky. 630 (1904); Brooks
v. Brooks, 31 K. L. R. 969 (1907); Wilson v. Mullins, 119 S. W. 1180
(Ky. 1909); Smith v. Smith, 121 S. W. 1002 (Ky. 1909); Martin IV.
Franklin, 159 Ky. 816 (1914).
1113 Ky. 946 (1902).
"Faris v. Dunn, 70 Ky. 276 (1870).
"See 40 Harv. L. R. 669, 685.
"In re Davis, 112 Fed. 129 (U. S. D. C. of Mass., 1901) A in fact
bought from X and took title in B for C, so that we have the first part
of the formula, A buys from X and takes title in B, but the last of it
Is lacking for in order to create a resulting trust the parties must have
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quate basis for it. If the consent of both mother and daughter
had been obtained no resulting trust could have been declared.
Where A and B make a joint purchase each furnishing a part
of the funds and title is taken in the name of A without the
consent of B it would seem after the passage of the statute35
as well as before 6 that a resulting trust should be raised.
The Kentucky court has on occasion failed to create a result-
ing trust pro tanto in favor of one who furnished only a small
fraction of the purchase price. In Benge v. Benge3T plaintiff
alleged that he contributed $50 and defendant $650 toward
the purchase of the land but no trust pro tanto was declared.
This situation is, of course, to be distinguished from the
case where the intended beneficiary of the purchase had no share
in the original transaction as where a father-in-law buys land
and makes the first payment and takes title, but at the same
time makes an oral agreement with his son-in-law that the latter
shall make the second payment and shall have the land.as There
is no resulting trust for the son-in-law even though he takes
possession under the oral agreement as he made no contribution
to the original purchase price nor incurred any obligation there-
for.39 The beneficiary of a resulting trust must have paid all
or a part of the purchase price or if the purchase was on credit,
must have incurred an obligation for the purchase price either
to the seller or to the one who made him the purchase money
loan.40
A father-in-law may convey land to his son-in-law, reciting
in the conveyance a consideration and that a part of it is an
advancement to his daughter. If it is to be considered that she
furnished the consideration, still it cannot be argued that title
was taken in her husband's name without her consent.41 In
intended the purchase to be for the benefit of A whereas it Is confess-
edly for C. If a trust is imposed for A to avoid the enrichment of B
it is contrary to the intention of the parties and so is constructive.
If a trust is imposed for C the Statute of Frauds is to be taken into
account.
"
5Nickels v. Clay, 14 K. L. R. 925 (1893) ; Webb v. Foley, 20 K. L. R.
1207 (1899).
'Letcher v. Letcher, 27 Ky. 590 (1830).
115 K. L. R. 514, 23 S. W. q68 (1993): cf. 40 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 687.
IWallace v. Marshall, 48 Ky. 148, 155 (1848).
See Scott, Resulting Trusts on the Purchase of Land, 40 Harv.
L. R. 669, 706-7 (1927).
Herlihy v. Coney, 99 Me. 469 (1905).41May v. May. 161 Ky. 114, 170 S. W. 537 (1914); Edington v.
Edington, 4 Ky. Op. 479 (1872).
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resulting trusts it is the presumed intention of the one furnish-
ing the consideration that is carried out when a trust is declared.
In this case, however, the person who alone had an effective
intent was the grantor. He should have added a statement in
the instrument that the conveyance was made for her sole use
and benefit to the extent of the advancement.
The failure to take title in the name of the party furnish-
ing the consideration may arise from fraud of the grantee, from
mistake or from mere breach of agreement. The fact that title
is taken in the wrong person by mistake should not prevent a
resulting trust from arising although it may be possible also to
work out on the same facts a constructive trust.42 Perhaps the
same reasoning should apply where land descends to a minor
and on sale of it, the administrator buys it in for her with estate
funds and promises to convey it to her when she reaches her
majority.43 The minor could not effectively consent to the trans-
action. At any rate, a constructive trust could have been raised
against the administrator as a fiduciary.
A problem has arisen as to the rights of a wife where a
resulting trust would normally have been enforced against the
husband but creditors of the trustee make a claim to the prop-
erty against the equitable owner (the wife), as purchasers for
value. 4 ' In Miller v. McLin45 the husband bought land with his
wife's money and wrongfully took title in his own name. The
court said: "When a wife gives her husband money and he
invests it in his own name, her claim will be subordinated to the
rights of creditors of the husband who are attempting to subject
the land to the payment of debts created while the title was in
the husband without knowledge of the equity of the wife." If
the wife has knowledge of the state of the title and makes no
effort lo correct it, she is probably estopped to claim the protec-
tion of her interest as to subsequent creditors without notice.
That is presumably the fact in this case though it does not
appear in the opinion. In Campbell v. Campbell40 title to prop-
'
2Ewing v. Bibb. 70 Ky. 654 (1870).
4- Stone v. Burge, 24 K. L. R. 2424 (1903).4 See Scott's Cases on Trusts, 2d., 1931, ftn. p. 688.
4'147 Ky. 248 (1912); cf. Phillips v. Bowles, 209 Ky. 580.
1'79 Ky. 395 (1881): cf. Miller v. Edwards, 70 Ky. 394 (18701 (Hus-
band had sold the land and had taken note for the purchase price
payable to himself, for her use. Creditors cannot attack transaction);
Phillips v. Bowles, 209 Ky. 580 (1925); Darnaby v. Darnaby, 77 Ky. 485
(1879); Sims v. Spaulding, 63 Ky. 121 (1865).
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erty for which the wife paid the consideration was made to the
husband. On discovering the facts she complained and the
husband thereupon transferred the title to their son in trust
for her. Such transfer was sustained against the claims of a
creditor of the husband who sought to impeach the transfer.
Even though creditors of the husband (at a time when his com-
mon law rights in her property prevail) may claim her property
so taken, the wife may be entitled to an equity of settlement and
if the husband in carrying out a trust obligation gives her no
more than she could get under her equity to a settlement, the
transfer will be sustained.4 7 In a number of cases the wife's
claim has been sustained as against prior creditors. 4 8
GR&NTEE PAYS THE PURCHASE PRICE AS A LoAx
Professor Scott assumes that a loan may be spelled out just
the same when B pays the purchase price to X in behalf of A
for conveyance made to himself, as where he hands over the
money to A and A takes title in B by way of security, if he
meant to lend the purchase price to A and A was obligated to
repay the same. The money paid over was never actually A's
money but otherwise there is no substantial difference between
the single transaction and two separate transactions, 49 since in
the former case the money was paid to the vendor at the bor-
rower's request. In Kentucky three types of situations have
arisen: (a) where A borrows the money from B and himself
pays it over,50 (b) where B buys the land at the request of A
and takes A's obligation to repay51 and (e) where A makes the
bargain for the land with X but B, the lender, actually pays the
money to X.52
Of course, if, in the first situation, there is no obligation
on the part of A to repay B there could be no loan and no trust5 3
4
'Latimer v. Glenn, 65 Ky. 535 (1866).
4Deboe v. Brown, 198 Ky. 275 (1923); ef. Woolfolk v. Earle, 19
K. L. R. 343, 40 S. W. 247 (1897).
4'40 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 685.
Chappell v. Hensley, 217 Ky. 749 (1927).
5 Honore v. Hutchings, 71 Ky. 687 (1871); Neel v. Moore, 19 K. L.
R. 918 (1897); Payne v. McClure Lodge, 115 S. W. 764 (Ky. 1909).
a2Erdman v. Kenney, 159 Ky. 509 (1914). The court speaks of the
constructive fraud of B.
Commonwealth v. C. d 0. R. R. Co.. 94 Ky. 16 (1893); Benge v.
Benge, 15 K. L. R. 514, 23 S. W. 668 (1893).
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would be declared. In Payne v. McClure Lodge54 an officer of
the lodge agreed to buy certain premises for the lodge and
furnished the funds therefor. It appears that the parties con-
templated that the rents would be used to repay the purchase
price. After sufficient rents had been collected for this purpose a
demand for conveyance was made, but the officer refused to con-
vey. An action was brought and a trust was declared evidently
upon the theory that the funds paid as the purchase price were
loaned and title was taken in defendant as security, and thus
a resulting trust arose. The court failed to observe the possible
bearing of 2353 upon the case and of the cases cited in support,
two were constructive trusts, and in the other no trust was
declared. Yet it is believed that the case may be sound and
that the statute was not intended to apply to an absolute con-
veyance by a third person intended to secure a loan5 5 made by
the grantee to the borrower. Yet there was no clear evidence
of an obligation by the lodge to pay the money if the rents should
not suffice. At one time an absolute conveyance to secure a loan
was not declared to be a mortgage in Kentucky. Later, however,
the intervening cases were expressly overruled 56 and the present
rule was established. In Harper v. Harper57 it was held where A
conveys to B, to pay a debt A owes B, with an agreement that
B should re-convey when the debt should be otherwise repaid,
that there was no relief for A if B refused. This result is prob-
ably to be accounted for by the analogy of the cases now over-
ruled.
In another case58 A made an arrangement with B whereby
B bought land near Chicago from X, advancing all the purchase
price, under an agreement in writing that "when the said land
is sold said B is to have his $6,000 so advanced with 10% and
the profits are to be equally divided between the parties. If the
property is not sold within eighteen months, A is to pay one-
half of the sum advanced with interest or B is to be the sole
owner of the same". The land was not sold within eighteen
" 115 S W. 764 (Ky. 1909).
"It was early held that an absolute conveyance given as security
for a debt would be treated in equity as a loan, Skinner v. Miller, 15
Ky. 84 (1824).
"Hobbs v. Rowland, 136 Ky. 197 (1909); see also Ryan v. Bank,
132 Ky. 625 (1909).
'168 Ky. 176 (1868).
"Honore v. Hutchings, 71 Ky. 687 (1871).
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months but it was sold later for a hundred thousand dollars. A
claimed his interest though he had not paid one-half the price
within the time agreed upon. Here it is clear that there was a
loan, that A was under obligation to repay it and that title was
taken in B as security, hence there was a resulting trust and the
statute should not apply where title is taken as security for a
loan.
If A has already purchased the land on installments and
subsequently borrows the money from B to make the later pay-
ments, and B takes title, the question is not shall a resulting
trust be raised but rather shall equity regard an absolute title
as a mortgage.59 If the borrower violates his agreement and
takes title in his own name a lien may be declared on the
premises in favor of the lender.60
The line is not always easy to draw between the situation
where B agrees to buy with his own money for A or for himself
and A, a mere agency, and the case where A agrees to furnish
the money as a loan and buy either for A or for both. In
fischli v. Dumaresly6 ' the court indicates that the allegation
that the purchase was made for both under an oral agreement
that plaintiff was to repay one-half the price and until repayment
he was to pay interest on it, was proved. But it refused
to spell out a loan to A. "The whole purchase price is
admitted to have been paid by B." This case, however, can
scarcely be distinguished from Payne v. McClure Lodge 62 save
that in the latter case the whole of the purchase price rather
than one-half of it was loaned by the title holder.
I. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
Dean Pound refers to the constructive trust as a purely
remedial expedient." Kentucky is one of several American
jurisdictions, which did not import the trust sections of the
Statute of Frauds. The use of the constructive trust may,
therefore, be even wider than that in jurisdictions where that
section is in force. We do, however, have the wills act. An
examination of the decisions in various jurisdictions shows the
"'McConnel v. Gentry, 30 K. L. R. 548 (1907).1Neel v. Moore, 19 K. L. R. 918 (1897).
6' 10 Ky. 23 (1820).62115 S. W. 764 (Ky. 1909).
Supra, n. 3.
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following situations where the constructive trust has been em-
ployed in order to accomplish a better remedy for the injured
party than can be obtained in a common law action.6 4
A. Where the trust is not expressly or is improperly
declared. In such cases where the disposition is inter vivos and
even though we have no seventh section we have to consider the
fourth section of the Statute of Frauds, dealing with contracts
concerning landO5 and the parol evidence rule should not be for-
gotten. If the disposition is by will, the Wills Statute is to be
considered.
B. Where a person acquires an interest in property in
regard to which by reason of his fiduciary character he owes a
duty to another.
C. Where property is acquired by one person by the
wrongful use of the property of another.
A. The Trust is not Expressly or is Improperly Declared.
1. A conveys to B inter vivos on an oral or intended trust
for A. B refuses to re-convey though his only fault may be a
breach of his promise. There is the possibility, however, that
he may also be guilty of having obtained the conveyance by
fraud or by breach of confidential relations.
2. A conveys to B inter vivos on an oral or intended trust
for C. If B refuses to hold for C his only fault may again be
that of breach of promise, or there may be fraud or breach of
confidential relations.
3. A gives property to B by will absolutely so far as
appears on the face of the will:-
a. There may be an oral promise by B to hold for C and a dis-
closure of the identity of C.
b. The gift may be absolute and the fact of the intention to create
a trust, as well as the identity of C may not be disclosed prior to the
death of the testator.
c. B may know by oral disclosure of A that he was to be a trustee
but he is not told who C is until after the death of A, which disclosure
is made by oral communication from someone or by a writing signed
by A that cannot be incorporated into the will.
4. A gives property to B by will, in trust, the will showing
that B was to be a trustee but the beneficiary is not disclosed in
"See Scott's Cases on Trusts (2nd ed., 1931), pp. 368-412, 440-516.
8 Carroll's Ky. Statutes, 1930, Sec. 470, par. 6.
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the will. The beneficiary may be orally disclosed or disclosed
by an instrument which cannot be incorporated into the will, or
never disclosed at all. (In this latter event the trust fails and
the gift results back to the heirs.)
1. A Conveys to B Inter Vivos on an Oral or Intended
Trust for A.
With this outline of the situations where an intended trust
is not expressly or is improperly declared let us examine the
decisions. It is to be recalled that the resulting use arising
where A enfoeffed B, a stranger, without consideration and
without mention of the use, did not descend to the law of trusts
and become a resulting trust. If any remedy is to be afforded it
must be on a different theory.
In type 1, if B simply refuses to perform his promise to
hold for A, or, if having made no promise, he claims the right
to keep though there was no intention on the part of the grantor
to benefit him, he is unjustly enriched at A's expense. In a
jurisdiction that has the seventh section of the English Statute
of Frauds, the express promise cannot be enforced but this fact
should not prevent the court from raising a constructive trust
and restore the status quo to prevent the unjust enrichment.
The case would then be governed by the eighth section and a
constructive trust should be raised to prevent unjust enrich-
ment. In a jurisdiction which does not have the seventh section,
it might perhaps be possible to carry out the express promise
and the court may for one reason and another find itself not
bound by the contracts section of the Statute nor by the parol
evidence rule. The English courts have raised a constructive
trust solely on the ground of unjust enrichment."6  Most Ameri-
can jurisdictions allow B to keep the property unless there was
present fraud or breach of confidential relations in which events
a constructive trust is raised.67 The following Kentucky eases
illustrate the problem here:
InT'izard Inv. Co. v. York6 8 a son-in-law, A, conveyed with-
'Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 208, Ch. 1865.
See Scott in 37 Harm. L. Rev. 653 (1924).
"167 Ky. 634 (1916). See also Holbrook v. Fyffe, 164 Ky. 435 (1915)
where it was held that a transfer of land by A to B on an oral trust
for B did not give B a beneficial interest. "Holbrook's claim to having
an interest in the land is perfectly idle"; Noonan v. Noonan, 206 Ky.
769 (1925) (Property to be reconveyed on demand).
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out, consideration to his father-in-law, B, his interest in a cer-
tain tract of land in order to enable B to carry out certain
option contracts which B had executed, the reason for the con-
veyance being that he was about to leave the state and it was
believed that B could deal with the contracts more expeditiously.
The options, however, expired and thereafter B contracted to
convey the premises to a purchaser, X, to which conveyance A
objected. X had full knowledge of all the facts before he made
the purchase. The conveyance to X was canceled on the theory
that B was a constructive trustee for A. The court spoke of the
confidential relations existing between A and B but it is evident
that apart from that fact a trust would have been declared. This
result seems sound. To allow B to deal with the property as if
it were his owm is to give him an unjust benefit.
The same principle seems applicable to another case.09  A
was being sued by his wife, C, for divorce. B induced him to
convey his land to himself, B, partly in order to embarrass the
wife in securing alimony. On A's death his personal repre-
sentative continued the suit which A had instituted for recover-
ing the land and he joined C in the action. B was declared
trustee as he was the moving force in the fraud on the wife, and
the parties were not regarded as being in pari delicto. Other-
wise, there would have been an unjust benefit to B. 70
Although the result may occasionally be the same whether
or not, a resulting or a constructive trust is raised still it is
believed that the observance of the distinction will often avoid
Anderson v. Meridith, 82 Ky. 564 (1883). See Bates v. Bates, 182
Ky. 566 (1918) (Children had conveyed their interests in certain land
to their father, B, without consideration and with the understanding
that as to the land conveyed he would die intestate. Thereafter, he
gratuitously conveyed the land to his second wife. The court said that
B meant to cheat the children but the evidence is merely that he broke
his promise). See also Vanderpool *. Vanderpool, 163 Ky. 742 (1915)
where a father, A, conveyed his land to his son B, with the understand-
ing that the latter should pay the grantor's debts and reconvey as soon
as he was repaid. B was declared a trustee at the suit of A's heirs.
This Is rather similar to the absolute conveyance which the court treats
as a mortgage.
" In White v. White, 229 Ky. 666 (1929) A, the father, transferred
to B, his son, certain stocks without consideration taking the certifi-
cates In B's name on an oral understanding that B would hold them
for A. B was declared trustee for A, but since A never delivered the
certificates to B it might well have been held that title never passed for
failure of delivery. If they had been delivered, it is clear that B would
still have been declared a constructive trustee.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
confusion and occasionally it will avoid an improper result. If
the trust be resulting then it is always necessary to consider
whether section 2353 applies. In Meadors v. Meadors,7 1 A had
conveyed certain premises to B on an oral trust for A. By
direction of A the premises were sold and other premises were
purchased from X and title again taken in the name of B. If
the latter part of the transaction alone is regarded it looks like
a resulting trust at which the above statutory provision is aimed,
for A consented. Looked at as a whole, a constructive trust,
A to B for A, was created, and A may now follow the pro-
ceeds into its changed form, not a resulting trust. The court
held in this case that the statute did not apply because of the
express oral agreement. Thus the court in order to do justice
adds to the section an exception which the legislature did not
make, nor in all probability intend. The statute should not
apply at all. The cases cited by the court are of the type rep-
resented by the formula, where B buys from X with A's money
and takes title in his own name, and so are properly within the
statute. The formulas are confused.
In another case72 it is believed that a wrong result was
reached by a similar confusion. The husband, A, beneficiary
of a life insurance policy on the life of his father, the premiums
on which he was paying, had his wife substituted as a benefici-
ary. On the death of the father the proceeds were invested
in land by the wife. Thereafter the spouses were divorced. The
Court of Appeals speaking through Mr. Justice Sampson, held
that since the husband's money went into the land she should be
a resulting trustee of the title. With deference, it is believed
that this view is doubly erroneous. The money was not the hus-
band's and never had been as he had validly made her the
beneficiary of the policy by way of gift of his interest therein.
Even if it had been the husband's money still he consented to
the taking of title by her and the statute would apply. Neither
is there ground here for raising a constructive trust. The form-
ula is A conveys to B on an oral trust for A, but there was no
oral understanding that the wife should hold the proceeds of the
- 192 Ky. 457 (1921).
12 Towles v. Towles, 176 Ky. 225 (1917).
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policy in trust for the husband and a gift cannot be properly
turned into a trust contrary' to the intention of the parties.73
The Kentucky cases seem clearly right in restoring the
status quo where A conveys to B not intending B to keep. This
is analogous to the case where A conveys to B absolutely but in
fact as security for a loan. The court will treat the conveyance
as a mortgage.7 4
PURCHASES AT JUDICIAL SALE
Analogous to the cases where A conveys to B intending that
B shall hold for A is a group of cases where A's property is
about to be sold for taxes or at judicial sale on execution against
A and he makes an oral agreement with B that B shall buy in
the premises and hold them for A and permit A, after repay-
ment of the price, to receive a reconveyance. Kentucky denies
that there is sufficient fiduciary relations between the parties to
create a constructive trust where B simply agrees to act as
agent to buy for A on a particular occasion, and in breach of
the promise buys for himself. Here, however, it seems that the
fact that A gives up something, namely, his interest in the prop-
erty sold and his right to protect it, in reliance upon the prom-
ise of B, creates the basis of the trust, that of relieving against
unjust enrichment, perhaps accompanied by an estoppel based
upon A's change of position. In many cases there is no fraud
by B but merely a breach of his promise.
If B buys A's land with his own money at judicial sale
under the agreement described the court has found no particular
difficulty in declaring a trust.75 Sometimes reasons are given
"Of course, without regard to the question whether B is a trustee
for A, where A conveys to B not intending him to take beneficially, it
Is always true that such a conveyance will not prevent the creditors of
A from following the property. See Rucker v. Abell, 47 Ky. 566 (1848).
"Parker v. Catron, 120 Ky. 145 (1905); Ryan v. Bank, 132 Ky. 625(1909). It was formerly' held that the intention could not be shown
Harper v. Harper, 68 Ky. 176 (1868), unless there was proof of fraud
or mistake. See Crutcher v. Muir, 90 Ky. 142 (1890). In Ramey v.
,Slone, 23 K. L. R. 301 (1901), A had asigned certain title bonds to B
and B therefor had promised to convey certain other premises to A.
On A's death B refused to convey the other premises. It was held that
A's, heirs might have a reconveyance of the land procured by B with
the title bonds.
"Hagarty v. Scott, 4 Ky. Op. 670 (1872); Howard v. Whitt, 8
K. L. R. 690 (1887); Miller v. Brady, 13 K. L. R. 682 (1892); Carter v.
Dotson, 29 K. L. R. 155 (1906); cf. Coons v. Clay, 27 K. L. R. 682,
1139 (1892).
K. L. J.-3
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for the results which are based on circumstances which are in
fact immaterial, such as constructive fraud, breach of confiden-
tial relations, very small sums which B paid, collusion, and the
like76 but it is finally admitted that neither fraud nor these
other circumstances need be present.7 7 Of course, if in addition
to buying A's land he also uses funds furnished in whole or in
part by A there would be ground for raising a resulting as
well as a constructive trust.7 8 But even where B uses his own
money he becomes a trustee and though the court sometimes
spells out a loan 79 (which would create a resulting trust) yet
proof of a loan in terms is not required.
It has been held that the fact that A remained in possession
many years after the sale without any claim, by B, of an interest
in the premises, is prima facie proof that B bought for A, 80 but
the fact that after the sale A did not pay rent to B is not suffi-
cient itself to prove such an agreement.8 1 The fact that A per-
mitted title to remain in B for a long period of years will not
defeat his right to have B declared a trustee.8 2 If such an agree-
ment was made and later B leased to A under a further oral
promise not to hold A for rent, the principle that a lessee may
not deny his landlord's title cannot be invoked against A when
he seeks to enforce the trust.8 3
In a number of cases B has represented himself as buying
for A or for the heirs of A without having made any agreement
with the interested parties in advance. In such cases having
induced other bidders not to bid by having the notices of the
sale removed, and by obtaining the premises at a much lower
price than they would otherwise have sold for, sometimes at
1G8reen v. Ball, 67 Ky. 586 (1868); Butler v. Prewitt, 21 K. L. R.
813 (1899); Ware v. Bennett, 143 Ky. 743 (1911).
'Burges v. Bosley, 6 Ky. Op. 50 (1882).
"Hopkins v. Tarlton, 7 Ky. 500 (1817); Graves v. Dugan, 36 Ky.
331 (1838); Turley v. Couchman, 7 Ky. Op. 54 (1873).
"Griffin v. Coffey, 48 Ky. 452 (1849); Fishback v. Green, 87 Ky.
107 (1888); Parker v. Catron, 120 Ky. 145 (1905); McKibben v. Diltz,
138 Ky. 684 (1910); Stone v. Middleton, 144 Ky. 284 (1911); Koehler
v. Almy, 161 Ky. 428 (1914).
"Howard v. Howard, 133 Ky. 568 (1909).
'Cummins v. Shawhan, 23 S. W. 669 (Ky. 1893).
32Williams v. Williams, 71 Ky. 241 (1871).
"Craddo k v. Ewn, 13 Ky. Op. 26 (1884).
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a very small price, he has effectually estopped himself from
denying that such an agreement was made by him. 84
It seems that the real basis for holding B a trustee for A is
that B is unjustly enriched at the expense of A, and that A,
by reliance on the promise has changed his position and has lost
something thereby. If A had no interest in the premises he
would have suffered no loss by the breach of B's promise, save
perhaps prospective profits. It will be worth while, therefore,
to examine the nature of A's interest.
Sometimes it is only a part interest,8 5 or a dower interest
that is protected, 86 or the interests of heirs,87 or devisees.88 A
joint owner may agree to buy for all at a foreclosure sale.89 On
the other hand, it has been held that a second lienor,90 a stock-
holder in a corporation, 91 a mere surety of the execution debtor
who had not paid the debt 92 have no such interest as to warrant
the court in declaring a constructive trust for their benefit based
upon an oral promise to purchase for such person. The agree-
ment to hold for A need not cover the entire interest of A that
is purchased and the trust will be declared only with respect to
the interest agreed upon.93
There are interesting Kentucky cases, which involve both
a resulting and a constructive trust. Thus, in Farris v. Farris94
B agreed with A and other co-devisees to buy in the premises for
all. B, thereafter, went to P and induced P to lend him the pur-
chase price and hold the title for A under a collusive agreement
with P to defraud A's co-devisees. Before the time for redemp-
"Estill v. Estill, 6 Iny. 177 (1813); Partlow v. Lane, 42 Ky. 424(1843); Roach v. Hudson, 71 Ky. 410 (1871); Vanbever v. Vanbever,
97 Ky. 344 (1895); Abell v. Cartmell, 8 Ky. Op. 562 (1895); Stubbin.
v. Briggs, 24 K. L. R. 230 (1902); cf. Wilis v. Lam, 158 Ky. 777 (1914)
for the estoppel doctrine.
85 Holtzclaw v. Wells, 166 Ky. 353 (1915).
"Griffin v. Coffey, 48 Ky. 452 (1849); Davis v. Spicer, 128 S. W.
294 (1910).
"Stephenson v. Stephenson, 6 Ky. 15 (1813); Farris v. Farris, 16
K. L. R. 729 (1895); Kaler v. Grady, 18 K. L. R. 678 (1896); Parker v.
Catron, 120 Ky. 145 (1905).
"Butler v. Prewitt, 53 S. W. 20 (Ky. 1899).
'Griffin v. Schlenk, 139 Ky. 523 (1907); cf. Dodd v. Story, 4 Ky.
Op. 87 (1870) (One of the patentees of land took patent to whole of the
land).
"Fields v. Hoskins, 182 Ky. 446 (1918).
""Willis v. Lam, 158 Ky. 777 (1914).
"Doom v. Brown, 171 Ky. 469 (1916).
"Miller v. Antle, 65 Ky. 408 (1867).
16 K. L. R. 729 (1895).
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tion had expired, the other co-heirs tendered their shares of the
redemption price. P refused to receive less than the whole
amount due and refused to convey a part only. After the time
for redemption had expired B paid P the amount of the loan
and took a reconveyance of the entire tract. It was held that
B was trustee for his co-devisees. 95
It is not always clear whether the agreement between the
parties was made before or after the purchase. In an early
case the court disapproved of such an agreement made before the
sale as though it were a fraud upon bidders. If the agreement
were made afterwards it was said that there was no considera-
tion for the promise made by B. 9 3 It does not seem difficult to
spell out a contract based upon sufficient consideration in such
cases but there would be no basis for raising a trust, no change
of position -by A and no unjust enrichment of B. Later, the
court looked upon the agreement made subsequently as a con-
ditional sale and would not enforce it unless it were in writing.9 7
In Wilson v. Wilson9" B bought a certain tract of land, part
of an estate, at judicial sale at about one-tenth of its value. Two
of the nine heirs were adult at the time and B had agreed with
them to pay each of the adults the actual value of their interests
but no such arrangement was made on behalf of the infants.
There can scarcely be said to have been any fraud practiced
upon the infants but B was unjustly enriched at their expense
and was declared a trustee for the sum received by him on resale.
In Oakes v. Oakes99 it appears that B and his brother, A,
attended a judicial sale of land. A had no existing interest in
the premises at the time but the court reached the same result as
it would have reached if he had had an interest. No specific
I The other cases are: Butler v. Prewitt, 21 K. L. R. 813 (1899) (B
bought for A but borrowed the money from P who took title in himself
in preference to becoming a surety for B with mortgage as protection);
Koechler v. Almy, 161 Ky. 428 (1914) (B bought for the owner but
took title in the name of his son, X).
"Kenney v. Marsh, 9 Ky. 46 (1819).
MEdrington v. Harper, 26 Ky. 353 (1830). But in Brey v. Barbour,
14 K. L. R. 655 (1893) the oral promise was not to reconvey but to
pay the market value of their interests if the promisees would allow
B to take an absolute conveyance and would not redeem. To this agree-
ment the Statute of Frauds applies. In Butler v. Stark, 25 K L. R.
1886 (1904), however, a trust in land was declared on a similar promise
that seems to have been made subsequent to the sale.
48 Ky. 274 (1848).
0204 Ky. 298 (1924).
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agreement between A and B was established. So far as appears,
B bought the land with his own money and took title. A and his
family moved onto the premises and lived there for many years.
B said he bought it for A and A improved it. B had been the
business man for his brothers and sisters attending to nearly all
matters of business for all of them. After the death of A, B
brought an action to recover possession of the premises. The
court, however, held that he was a trustee for A. The reason
is not clear. Under the rule of Fisch/i v. Dmnaresy'0 0 an agent,
under an oral agreement to buy land with his own money for
another is not a trustee if he buys for himself. Breach of con-
fidential relations was not specifically mentioned by the court,
nor was there any proof of a loan by B to A nor of any repay-
ment by A to B. It does not appear, however, that the court
intended to overrule Fischli v. Dumaresly'0 1 and the other cases
following it. All we can say is that the rule on that point is now
unsettled; viz.: if B orally promises to buy land for A at a
judicial sale (in which land A has no existing interest) but in-
stead buys it in his own name, it is not so clear now whether he
is a trustee or not. He is perhaps if there is also a breach of
confidential relations.
Kentucky, along with a few other states, holds that the
entire assignment of a life insurance policy to a creditor, how-
ever honest, is valid only to the extent of the assignee's outlay
and as to any remainder he is a trustee for the assignee. In one
case102 the assignee bought at judicial sale the interest of the
beneficiary after the latter's petition to be permitted to sell the
same had been granted. The outlay was $731. The proceeds
amounted to $2,500. Perhaps the court regards the assignee as
unjustly enriched at the expense of the assignor.
In another case' 0 3 the ground for holding B to be a trustee
is not clear. B, the father, had executed a gratuitous convey-
ance to A, his son, and put the latter in possession. He neither
delivered nor recorded the conveyance. A died and his children
continued in possession and the premises were managed by their
guardian. Later B sold the premises to C but refused to con-
vey and C sued for specific performance. It was held that B
1-10 Ky. 23 (1820).
IOL Ibid.
""Irons v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ky. 640 (1908).1 Cyrus v. Holbroolk, 32 K. L. R. 466 (1907).
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was trustee for the heirs of A, and C could not obtain specific
performance of the contract.
Breach of Confidential Relations. Just what is required to
constitute confidential relations cannot easily be indicated. The
situation must be such that one person imposes an unusual trust
and confidence in another, relying on that other for advice. For
example, a father is regarded as being in a confidential relation
to his minor children but he is not so necessarily toward his
major children. Special confidence may be imposed where there
is no legal relationship and between strangers as well as between
close relations and, of course, often does arise between brothers
and sisters and between persons betrothed. 10 4
A breach of confidential relations whereby B obtains A's
property and uses it for his own benefit is sufficient to cause B
to be regarded as a constructive trustee for A. So in Graham v.
King 05 a mother-in-law entrusted her money to her son-in-law
to invest in real estate for her. He did so invest the money
intrusted to him, but took title not in the name of the mother-in-
law but in the name of his wife. It seems that the wife was not
an original party to the wrong, hence it would be fair to say
that there was no such breach on her part. The court rightly
held her to be a constructive trustee. She was unjustly enriched
by the tort of her husband. 0 6 This does not seem to be a result-
ing trust and section 2353 should not be held applicable nor is
either exception applicable. There is the same result where a
nephew takes advantage of the confidential relations he enjoys
and induces a feeble uncle after he has sustained a paralytic
stroke to convey all his estate to the former in consideration of
care and support to be furnished by the former to the latter
during the remainder of his life.107
20S1ee 13 Calif. L. Rev. 174, 176 (1925).
'- 96 Ky. 339 (1894).
1"For a contrary result see Dye v. Parker, 108 Kan. 304, 195 Pac.
599 (1921).
2"TMcDowefl v. Edwards, 156 Ky. 475 (1913). See many other cases
there cited. See also Middleton v. Beasley, 186 Ky. 252 (1919) where
husband and wife each had children by a prior marriage. They bought
certain land under an agreement that the spouses and both sets of
children should combine their efforts and pay for it and share it pro-
portionally. Before title was fully acquired the wife died and the
husband perfected title in his own name. By this breach of con-
fidential relations it was held that he was pro tanto trustee for the
wife's children.
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2. A Conveys to B Inter Vivos on an Oral or Intended
Trust for C.
If A conveys land to B inter vivos on an oral trust for C it
seems that in most jurisdictions B can be compelled to hold for
C even though there is a statute corresponding to the seventh
section of the Statute of Frauds. 0 8 Naturally, in Kentucky
where there is no such statute it has not been difficult to raise
a trust for C.109 In Becker v. Newrath"10 the husband had con-
veyed property to his second wife absolutely. She orally
promised to use it for life and at her death leave it to his
children. If she should leave no will the land would descend to
her sister. It was held that a constructive trust could be estab-
lished and that fraud was not necessary, but merely the failure
to carry out the agreement was sufficient. The promise was
made by her after the conveyance was executed. In this case it
further appears that the conveyance was made in contemplation
of death. It is sometimes thought that that fact distinguishes
this type of case from the ordinary inter vivos conveyance on
oral trust because of the difficulty of restoring the status qua
prior to the death of A. There would usually be no breach of
the promise till after the grantor was dead.
3. Absolute Gift by Will on Oral Trust for Third Person.
The gift is absolute so far as appears from the will. There
may, however, be three situations.
(a) B may promise the testator, A, to hold for C who is
clearly identified. In Caldwell v. Calduell"1 it was held if B
failed to keep his oral promise to hold for C, that a constructive
trust would be imposed upon him for the benefit of C, the court
observing that this refusal would amount to constructive fraud.
The court did not decide upon whom the fraud was practiced,
whether upon A or upon C, nor did it find in fact any more
serious misconduct upon the part of B than a breach of his
37 Harv. L. Rev. 653, 664.
1o Taylor v. Fox, 162 Ky. 804 (1915); cf. Chapman v. Chapman,
152 Ky. 344 (1913) (Father and son executed simultaneous wills by
oral contract. After death of son and after the father had profited
by the son's will he attempted to repudiate his will. He was declared a
trustee of the land he had agreed to dispose of by will).
-1149 Ky. 421 (1912).
-'70 Ky. 515 (1871).
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promise. If there was any fraud it must have been practiced
upon A and not upon C, but there wasn't any. There was an
unjust enrichment, however, at the expense of the testator which
should be remedied for the benefit of the testator's heirs.
Furthermore, the Wills Act seems to stand absolutely in the way
of giving any interest under a will to C that is not made either
by a holographic will or by one attested and subscribed. The
Caldwell rule, however is well settled in Kentucky 12 and in
many other jurisdictions. This flying in the face of the statute
is, of course, because of sympathy for C. B should not keep the
property iu any event. But that result may be avoided by
restoring the status quo as nearly as possible. The restoration
of the status quo would take the property from B and would
give it back to the estate as undisposed of, that is, the purpose
of A in giving the property to B, having failed of accomplish-
ment the estate should go back to the giver. The fact, however,
that B may be one of the heirs and so might take as much as C
of the undisposed land, in addition to what he received by the
devise to himself, makes a case of much hardship upon C, but
statutes should not be bent at pleasure to suit individual cases.
If B should wrongfully interfere to prevent a gift being
made to C and should induce the making of the gift to himself
which C would inevitably have received but for the act of B,
in such case it may well be that B's conduct amounts to a tort to
C's expectancy and should be compensated for specifically by
a court of equity. In such case, B would be properly declared
a trustee for C.113 So where B is already beneficiary of a will
and by duress prevents the alteration of it, which alteration
would have benefitted C, a constructive trust may be raised
against B for the benefit of C.114
(b) Where A makes an absolute gift by wlT to B intend-
ing that B shall hold for C but B is not informed before the
death of the testator that a trust is intended and no disclosure
of the identity of the beneficiary is made it has been held that
112 Chapman v. Chapman, 152 Ky. 344 (1913); Taylor v. Fox, 162
Ky. 804 (1915); Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky. 456 (1921), 230 S. W. 906.
n1 See Stout v. Stout, 165 Ia. 552, 146 N. W. 474 (1914); Reardon
v. Reardon, 219 Mass. 594, 107 N. E. 522 (1914).
n4 Gains v. Gains, 9 Ky. 190 (1822) (It was held that where the
beneficiary of a will forceably prevented revocation of it, still the will
must be probated, but the fraudulent devisee may by proper action be
made a trustee for the party entitled to the estate).
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B may keep the property so received. There is no unconscien-
tious conduct which requires him to surren4er the property to
the intended beneficiary nor to the heirs. He is like any other
devisee or legatee.3" 5
(c) Where there is an absolute testamentary gift by A to
B on an oral trust but the beneficiary, C, is not disclosed during
the life of A, the better view is that the trust fails and that B
must hold for the heirs."26 This would be as near as possible to
a restoration of the status quo. Any other result conflicts with
the Wills Statute. This result does not necessarily conflict with
the Caldwell v. Caldwell rule because there the beneficiary, it
will be remembered, was orally disclosed. There is nothing to
prevent the adoption of the view in this jurisdiction that the
trust fails.
4. Testamentary Gift in Trust but the Will does not Dis-
close the Beneficiary.
Suppose the gift is expressly made in trust on the face of
the will but the beneficiary is not therein indicated, but is, how-
ever, orally disclosed. There are two views whether or not the
intended beneficiary may take the property. lMlassachusetts 1 7
and a good many other jurisdictions hold that the beneficiary
cannot take the gift. The Wills Act stands squarely in the way.
The problem is presented in Hlaghes v. Bent."' s The testatrix
left certain property to her daughter "as a sacred trust knowing
that she will faithfully carry out my wishes regarding it". The
wishes were communicated to B and were written out on a
separate paper signed by testatrix, this paper and the will hav-
ing been prepared at the same time. Presumably the separate
paper could not be incorporated by reference into the will as
there was no reference at all to such paper. The usual rules as
to incorporation by reference" 9 are (a) the incorporated paper
must be in existence at the time the will is executed; (b) it must
be referred to as being in existence and (c) in such terms as
make it identifiable. That was not the case here. The court
6 Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 396 (1876); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 653,679.
"In re Boyes, 26 Ch. Div. 531 (1884), 37 Harv. L. R. 677.
'" Olfiffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221 (1881), 37 Harv. L. Rev. 683, n. 86.
u, 118 Ky. 609 (1904).
m See Evans "Incorporation by Reference," etc., 25 Col. L. Rev. 879
(1925).
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said that there was no doubt about the identity of the -bene-
ficiaries or of their, interest in the estate "and (the identification
of the paper) makes it proper to treat the paper as a part of the
will and to seek its aid in construing the instrument". It
appears, therefore, that if the identity of the beneficiary is in
any way communicated to the trustee, the gift will be carried
out in Kentucky. Some other jurisdictions have reached the
same result.120
B. FIDucIARY REATIONS
If A orally employs B as his agent for the special purpose
of negotiating the purchase of Blackaere for A, and B, in viola-
tion of his agreement, buys Blackaere for himself, some courts
have held that this was such a violation of a fiduciary relation-
ship as to warrant making B a constructive trustee for A.
121
Kentucky, however, ever since the problem was first brought
before its highest court has held that a trust could not be set
up.' 22 This special agency is not regarded as sufficient to make
B a fiduciary.
2'Bacwel v. Blackwell, A. C. 318 (1929), 37 Harv. L. Rav. 653,
683 n. 85 (1924).
21Havnor Land Co. v. MacGregor, 169 Ia. 5, 149 N. W. 617 (1914);
Harrop v. Cola, 85 N. J. Eq. 32, 86 N. J. Eq. 250 (1914); Rush v. Mac-
Pherson, 176 N. C. 562, 97 S. E. 613 (1918); Kern v. Smith, 290 Pa. 566,
139 Atl. 450 (1927).
122Parker v. Bocdley, 7 Ky. 102 (1815) (A was to buy for himself
and B and B was to advance one-half of the price); FischiN v.
Dumaresly, 10 Ky. 23 (1820) (A was to advance all of the funds, one-
half by way of a loan to B); Fowke v. Slaughter, 10 Ky. 56 (1820) (A
bought the land from X at $6.00 per acre and resold it to B and C at
$8.00 per acre. He brought an action for the price. It was held that
the parol agreement that A was to buy for B and C could not be
proved); Dehaven v. Sterrit, 26 Ky. 27 (1829) (Son-in-law bought up
claims against' his father-in-law's land with his own money); Estes v.
Estes, 142 Ky. 261 (1911) (Semble); Wiedemann v. Crawford, 142 Ky.
303 (1911) (A was to furnish all the money); Day v. Amburgey, 147
Ky. 123 (1812) (Semble. Court cites decisions contra in other states
but declares they represent the minority view); Burns v. Eastham, 12
Ky. Op. 52 (1883) (B was about to enter certain land under a land
warrant. A, told B that he would enter it for C and B gave way. A,
however, entered the land in his own name); Doom v. Brown, 171 Ky.
469 (1916) (Mortgagee promised the surety of the mortgagor to buy in
the mortgagor's land at judicial sale for the benefit of the surety);
Sherley v. Sherley, 97 Ky. 512 (1895) (Semble). In accord with the
Kentucky rule are Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351 (1885); Farnham v.
elements, 51 Me. 426 (1863); Emerson v. Galloupe, 158 Mass. 146, 32
N. E. 1118 (1893).
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In Kimmons v. Barnes123 B had requested his intimate
friend, A, to buy certain premises for him, B. A bought the
premises with his wife's money and took title in his wife's name.
It was held that neither the breach of confidence nor the special
agency relation, nor the two factors together would suffice to
make A a constructive trustee. A special agent, however, who
is supplied with funds by the principal will be made trustee if
he takes title to himself. It is probable that the reason is not
that he a fiduciary but rather that there arises a resulting trust
in favor of the one who furnished the funds.
A general agent or trusted manager is a fiduciary and can-
not keep property which he has acquired in breach of his obliga-
tion.1 24 So a person in any fiduciary position (other than a
special agent for a particular occasion) such as a partner cannot
acquire property for his own benefit when he owes a dutr to
another with respect to the property.125
There are certain so-called partnership cases which are not
readily harmonized with the position stated above. Relying
upon an earlier case which does not in fact raise our present
problem' 26 the court held that in cases of oral agreements be-
tween A and B looking toward a joint adventure in the pur-
chase of a particular tract of land, if A, in violation of the agree-
ment bought the premises for himself, he should be made a con-
structive trustee even though B had neither as yet furnished a
part of the consideration nor had agreed upon a loan from A,
nor had any previous interest in the premises so purchased. So
in Goodwin v. Smith127 A and B made an agreement that B
should lease a certain gas and oil field for the benefit of both.
They had not been partners previously. It was declared that
B held the leasehold interest for the benefit of the partners.
This, however, was a mere incident in the case. It is not clear
that the partnership was formed before B made the lease nor
is it clear whose money was used. In Mallon v. Buster'28 A
12205 Ky. 502 (1924).
"'Hoge v. Ky. River Corp., 216 Ky. 51 (1926).
'-"Farmer v. Samuel, 14 Ky. 187 (1823); Hart v. Hawkins, 6
Ky. 502 (1814); cf. Clayton v. Clayton, 11 K. L. R. 472 (1889) (Admin-
Istratrix buys lands with estate funds).
Garth v. Davis, 120 Ky. 106 (1905).
-'144 Ky. 41 (1911).
22121 Ky. 379 (1905) (Disapproved in Bwing v. Clore, 219 Ky. 329
(1927); cf. Stewart v. Stovall, 191 Ky. 508 (1921) (Parties had agreed
that they would operate the farm jointly).
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and B had each bid for certain lands being offered at auction
sale. Thereupon they entered an oral agreement that B should
make the purchase for both and thereafter they would divide
the premises. B accordingly made the purchase with his own
funds and took title in his own name. This does not seem to
constitute a partnership nor is it even a joint adventure yet B
was made a constructive trustee for A. The only ground would
seem to be that he is a fiduciary. Yet even if he were to be
regarded as a partner for the occasion he is no more a fiduciary
than any other special agent. This case was later dis-
approved.129 In Stewart v. Stovall'30 A and B each desired
certain premises which were to be sold at judicial sale and to
avoid bidding against each other they orally agreed that A
should bid in the premises and that thereafter a division would
be made. This was called a partnership agreement and was
enforced.
In Ewing v. Clore'3 1 a partnership was alleged in order to
make B, who had bought with his own funds, a trustee but the
allegation that the parties were to buy and divide was held not
sufficient. The court said that there was but a single purchase,
and no expectation of joint ownership of any part of the land
but each was to be the sole holder of a desIgnated portion of it,
a mere agency. Again in Conant v. Mason s3 2 it was held that
where an agreement was made by A and B for a specific under-
taking, that being the purchase of Blackaere for both, by B, and
the parties were not general partners, it is not presumed that
the joint adventure is to continue indefinitely and so prevent
individual action for all time. It was held that the partnership
so-called was dissolved by the death of one of the members
and that thereafter the purchase by the other member would
not constitute him a partner. It is, therefore, believed that
there is not much left in Kentucky of the proposition that par-
ties may form a partnership for the purpose of purchasing a
certain tract of land and that if one does purchase after such
an agreement with his own money and take title in his own
name, he is a trustee.
12 Towles v. Towles, 176 Ky. 225 (1917).
23*191 Ky. 508 (1921); cf. Vaught' v. Hogue, 32 K. Ia R. 1061
(1908).
1-219 Ky. 329 (1927).
112212 Ky. 692 (1926).
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Other illustrations of trusts arising from breach of fiduciary
duty occur. Thus an attorney for an estate offered for sale
cannot buy for himself at the sale; s133 nor may the agent of a
non-resident whose property is sold at a tax or other public sale
and the same is true of a sale by a special commissioner. 134 A
guardian 3 who buys in the ward's interest for himself is under
a similar obligation; so is an executor or administrator. 136 If
the executor compounds a claim against the estate buying it in
for less than par or if while acting as trustee of land in which
he also owns a moiety beneficially, he surrenders a portion of
the land in the process of settling with a claimant who has a
superior title, he cannot keep the land, retained as his own and
urge that the surrendered portion was the beneficiary's share.ls 7
It seems to follow that trustees cannot buy from themselves at
private sale with any better grace than they can buy at a
judicial sale. Thus in Clay v. Tlwmas 138 there were two
brothers and two sisters, the two brothers and another person
being trustees of two-fourths of certain premises for their
sisters but the brothers were the beneficial owners of the re-
mainder. They bought their sister's interests and then the
brothers attempted to convey to each of themselves a one-fourth
interest to be held individually and free from the trust. It was
held that they were buying from themselves, not from their
beneficiaries, and that such a sale could be made only on order
of the court.139
C. PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY THE WRONGFUL USE OF THE PROPERTY
OF ANOTHER
If a life tenant with power to sell the remainder, does so
'3 Walker v. Carter, 208 Ky. 197 (1925); Phillips v. Phillips, 26
K. L. R. 145 (1904).
234 Titherington v. Hodge, 81 Ky. 286 (1883).
1
'Lee v. Fox, 36 Ky. 171 (1838); cf. Scott v. Scott, 183 Ky. 604(1909) (B falsely representing to A that he owned the fee in certain
land when he had only a life estate, sold the land to A with covenants.
He was made a constructive trustee for the remainderman of land
bought with the purchase price to the extent of the value of the re-
mainder).
1"Faucett v. Faucett, 64 Ky. 511 (1866).
"
T McCtanahan v. Henderson, 9 Ky. 388 (1820).
"178 Ky. 199 (1917).
I The obligations of co-owners toward each other and under what
circumstances one becomes a trustee for another in Kentucky are not
here considered.
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and invests the proceeds in other land and takes title thereto
in her own name, the remaindermen may follow the proceeds
into the land thus purchased. 140  It was once the view in some
jurisdictions that if B wrongfully converted the property of A
and with it or its proceeds acquired other property, no trust
would arise in the property so acquired in favor of A.1 41 It is
now generally agreed, however, that the constructive trust is a
remedial device rather than a substantive institution. It, there-
fore, appears that A may follow the property into its changed
form until it reaches the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value.142 So where property reaches the hands of a purchaser
with notice he may not prevail over the claim of the bene-
ficiary.143 Where B obtains a land settlement certificate belong-
ing to A (then deceased) and took out patent in the name of C
who knew plaintiff was A's heir and owner of the certificate, C
became a trustee for plaintiff. 44 In the recent case Ringo v.
McFarland145 a county employee embezzled county funds and
used them in purchasing and improving certain real estate.
When the embezzlement was discovered and he was arrested he
employed attorneys to defend him and gave them a mortgage
on the property thus acquired, in compensation for services to
be rendered. The county was permitted to follow the funds into
the property and it was decided that the attorneys were not
purchasers for value having rendered no service at the time the
mortgage was executed.
In another case1 40 A sold certain slaves to C for part cash,
and for the remainder C gave his notes. B came from another
state and by falsely claiming the slaves as his own, induced A
10 McCormick v. McCormick, 121 S. W. 450 (Ky. 1909); cf. Farmers'
Bank v. Bailey, 221 Ky. 55 (1927); Motley v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 (1925).
'1 Campbell v. Drake, 4 Ired. Eq. 94 (N. C. 1844) ("plaintiff never
trusted him"); see 37 Yale L. Jour. 654.112Perry v. Head, 8 Ky. 46 (1817); Dean v. AZlin, 5 Ky. Op. 642(1871); Trevathan v. Dees, 221 Ky. 396 (1927) (Husband converted his
deceased wife's stocks and had certificates issued to himself); Skid-
more v. Harris, 157 Ky. 756 (1914) (A had an unrecorded deed at his
death which B destroyed and procured from the grantor by false rep-
resentations a new conveyance to himself); Smith v. Cornett, 26 K. L.
R. 265 (1904).
2, Stratton v. Stratton, 149 Ky. 473 (1912).
11"McNitt v. Logan, 16 Ky. 60 (1808); cf. Dixon v. Caldwell, 15
Oh. St. 412 (1864) where the certificate passed to a purchaser without
notice.
n 232 Ky. 622 (1930).
2"Jones v. Chappell, 21 Ky. 422 (1827).
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to compromise with him whereby A surrendered the C notes to
B. These notes were then canceled by B, and C executed similar
notes to B. Later B sued on these notes and'obtained judgment.
Thereafter, A learned of the fraud of B and filed a bill praying
that he be decreed the benefit of B's judgment against A and
this relief was granted, B being a constructive trustee of the
judgment for A.
If the wrongdoer wrongfully commingles another's funds
with his own, it is generally held that the injured party may
follow the funds or have a lien upon the commingled sum for
the amount taken so long as there is anything left of the sum so.
commingled.147 But if the funds have been exhausted 148 or if
they cannot be traced at all, 149 then such rights do not exist.
Two Kentucky cases' 50 seem to hold that where an investment is
made in bank stock out of the commingled fund, the bene-
ficiary has no preference over the general creditors in the thing
purchased.
"If the trust fund has consisted of money and has been commingled
with other moneys of the trustee in one mass, undivided and undis-
tinguishable and the guardian has made investments generally from
the money in his possession, the cestui que trust cannot claim a specific
lien upon the property or funds constituting the investment.""'
Professor Ames notes that the Kentucky cases are contra to
the better view.152
If trust funds are wrongfully commingled and the combined
funds are used indiscriminately by a bank to pay debts and
expenses of the bank and to pay the checks of general depositors,
by the weight of authority no preference is given to the bene-
ficiary just because the sums on hand may be larger than they
would otherwise have been, if the obligations of the bank had
been paid out of the bank's proper funds.' 53
SUMMARY
A resulting trust arises (a) where an express trust fails in
2" Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104 (1902); In re Oatway (1903)
2 Ch. 356; see Scott-The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully/ Com-
mingled, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125 (1914).
"$New Farmers' Bank v. Cockrell, 106 Ky. 578 (1899).20 Crockett v. Ohio Valley Banking Co., 174 Ky. 409 (1917).
" Bevan v. Citizen 's Bank, 19 K. L. R. 1261 (1897); Bright v. King,
20 K. L. R. 186 (1898).
"I Bevan v. Citizen's Bank, supra, N. 150, at page 1263.
lu 19 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 519 n. 3.
' Farmers' National Bank v. Cockrell, 106 Ky. 578 (1899).
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whole or in part, (b) where an express trust does not exhaust the
entire property transferred to the trustee, and (c) where the
purchase money is paid by one person and the conveyance is
taken in the name of another. It was with reference to this last
class that section 2353 was enacted. The common law resulting
use where A conveyed to B without consideration and without
intending to benefit B or any other person, did not come down
to the law of trusts. Hence, if B is made a trustee in such a
case the trust must be regarded as a constructive trust. In
Kentucky under (a) a trust does not result to the contributor
if he has received any consideration for his contribution.
So constructive trusts may arise inter vivos, where the
grantor conveys to the grantee with an oral understanding that
the grantee shall hold for the grantor, or where the agreement
is that the grantee shall hold for a third person. Kentucky
seems to enforce the oral promise in both cases. A fortiori a
trust would be enforced if fraud or duress or breach of confi-
dential relations were practiced by the grantee. A constructive
trust arises where B purchases A's property sold at judicial sale
if B has promised to buy for A and A has relied upon the
promise and made no other effort to protect his interests.
If A conveys to B by wilt absolutely on an oral trust for 0,
the promise of B is carried out in spite of the Wills Act. If the
devise is "in trust" on the face of the will but there is a written
disclosure of the beneficiary which cannot be incorporated into
the will, still the devise goes to C, again in spite of the Statute
of Wills.
Property acquired by one with reference to which he owes
a duty to another because of his fiduciary relations will be made
the subject of a constructive trust. But a mere special agency,
to buy for another is not regarded as a fiduciary relation. How-
ever Oakes v. Oakes154 more or less upsets this rule and the Ken-
tucky position is now not clear. A partner is a fiduciary. That
a trustee can take no benefit from his position as trustee other
than compensation for services is well established.
A trust may also arise as a purely remedial device where
there are no fiduciary relations. If wrongfully B takes A's prop-
erty and receives something else in exchange for it, A may follow
his property into the new acquisition. If there is a wrongfully
2-204 Ky. 298 (1924).
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commingling of funds, the injured party may either follow his
own share into the combined account or he may have a lien on
that account for his share. This rule ought to continue to apply
where the wrongdoer has drawn out a part from the combined
account and invested it, that is, the injured person should be
able to fasten upon both the subject of the investment and upon
anything that still remains. Two cases seem to hold, however,
that he cannot assert his claim against the subject matter of the
investment. It is held, however, that the mere swelling of funds
will not give the injured party a preference if he cannot estab-
lish that any of his own share still remains in the combined
funds.
ALvnT E. EvANs.
K. L. J.-4
